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I. Introduction
The current civil service disciplinary rules are diverse in two
Middle East Gulf Countries: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This article
examines the differences, similarities, and trends between these two
legal systems, while exploring the major issues which are illustrative
of the fundamental principles of both. The article then reviews the
relative merits of each legal system, and it proposes suggestions for
maintaining administrative reform and improving efficiency in the
civil service.
The legal and social foundations of these civil service discipli-
nary systems, addressed in Section II, raise several provocative ques-
tions. Are Saudi and Kuwaiti disciplinary systems derived solely
from Islamic law, or are they developing on another basis? What is
the influence of shari'a,1 if any, upon both disciplinary legal sys-
tems? What is the response of the authorities in both countries to
the difficulties involved in the tension between tradition and
modernization?
1. Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the
Shari'a to Regulate Development, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 416-17 (1979) (authored
by Bryant W. Seaman) [hereinafter Seaman]. See also 3 THE MODERN SAUDI DIGEST 417
(1972) [hereinafter SAUDI DIGEST].
The word shari'a is the name given to the totality of God's commandments,
comprising the moral and practical injunctions embodied in the Quran and the
traditions of the Prophet, as well as other legal rules derived from sources com-
plementary to these two principal sources. In Islamic tradition, the 'shari'a' as-
sumes the central function of guiding communal order and ethics.
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The constitutional structure and powers of disciplinary and
managerial authorities are the main concern of Section III. Official
offenses and disciplinary penalties are explained; interplay between
social habits and moral rules, on the one hand, and disciplinary legal
rules and penalties, on the other hand, are examined. Must civil ser-
vice disciplinary penalties be restricted to offenses related to work, or
should penalties be imposed on officials acting as ordinary citizens in
daily life? This question is answered in light of Section II.
Section IV deals with the final major issue involved in the com-
parison. What are the procedural safeguards and channels of review
available for civil servants in both disciplinary systems? Notwith-
standing that these legal systems operate in relatively newly-estab-
lished developing countries, there are set legal rules which can guide
disciplinary authorities.
Section V concludes that efforts have been made to improve the
civil service in these countries and to adapt disciplinary rules to the
requirements of the workplace. Meanwhile, social, constitutional, le-
gal, and managerial obstacles hinder workplace efficiency and limit
improvements in these disciplinary legal systems. This article sug-
gests that defects in both legal systems might be cured through
planned intervention, based on the social values and heritages of the
societies in both countries, which would enhance social developments
through legislative and managerial changes.
II. Constitutional and Legal Backgrounds
A. Saudi Arabia
1. Introduction.-The Islamic "Sunni" Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia2 (Kingdom) follows the hanbali school' of Islamic jurispru-
dence. This classical school of thought firmly adheres to the direc-
tives and injunctions embodied in the holy Koran and Sunnah.4 The
2. The Kingdom was formally established in 1932. Seaman, supra note I, at 425-26.
Shaykh Mohammed Ibn Abdul al-Wahhab and his religious movement, and imam Moham-
med Ibn Saud, "established an alliance in 1744 A.D. in accordance with the 'hanbali' doctrine
that the ulama should join forces with those in political power (Umara) to create a true Is-
lamic society." Id. "This alliance of Wahhabi religious fervor with al-Saud expansionism was
an essential element in the forces which led to the unification of most of the Arabian peninsula
as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. ... Id. at 423-24.
3. For information concerning this school of Islamic jurisprudence, see Makdisi, The
Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History, 10 INT. J. OF MIDDLE
E. STUD. 1-8 (1979). See also Humphreys, Islam and Political Values In Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Syria, 33 MIDDLE E. J. 1 (1979).
4. According to this school, in the early stage of Islam ijma (i.e., full agreement between
Muslim jurists concerning a case) is confined to opinions given by the Companions. The Com-
panions were disciples of the Prophet Mohammed. After Mohammed's death, they continued
to follow the Quran (Koran) and Sunnah as a basis for religion and government. In stages
following that early period of Islam, ulama (i.e., full agreement) concerning these doctrines
failed to answer the new arising questions of life. "This restrictive interpretation of consensus
in its classical technical sense inhibits its use as a source of law responsive to the needs of
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Koran is the constitution of Muslims; no secular authority can enact
laws against the will of God. Followers of the hanbali school believe
that God has revealed to "His Prophet," Mohammed, all the rules
which are suitable and necessary for regulating daily conduct. These
rules regulate governmental affairs and activities, as well as all civil
law matters and religious duties.5
From the inception of the establishment of Saudi Arabia, its
founder, King Abdul Aziz, was faced by this rigid interpretation of
the rules of Islam.6 In fact, Muslim conservatives concluded their
1926 conference in Mecca by declaring that secular legislation was
both a fiction and a device of the devil, and it had no basis either in
the Koran or in the traditions of Islam. They also maintained that
taxes and technological inventions enjoyed no support from Islam. 7
Therefore, from the very beginning, King Abdul Aziz proposed
to govern the country according to the opinions of the hanbali
school. He maintained that his rule would be based on the principles
of Islam, including consultation with selected notables, concerning
the conduct of the new state's affairs.' In implementing this goal,
shari'a courts were established to resolve individual and government
disputes according to Islamic rules embodied in the Koran and
Sunnah.9
Confrontation between the conservative ikhwan n and Abdul
Aziz's government was inevitable. The ikhwan had remained
steadfast against the regulation of the Saudi Kingdom's affairs by
Saudi Arabia's changing society." Seaman, supra note 1, at 419.
5. Id. at 41,7.
6. Concerning the influence of Muslim conservatives on government activities in Saudi
Arabia, see Bligh, The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System
of the Kingdom, 17 INT. J. OF MIDDLE E STUD. 37-50 (1985); Edens, The Anatomy of the
Saudi Revolution, 5 INT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 50-64 (1974); Kechichian, The Role of the
Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia, 18 INT. J. OF MIDDLE
E. STUD. 53-71 (1986); Comment, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle
Eastern Legal Systems: The Forihationi and Binding Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 384 (1970) (authored by P. Nicholas Kourides).
7. Radical Wahhabi's are called ikhwan (i.e., brothers in Islam). They conferred in
Mecca in 1926. SAUDI DIGEST. supra note 1, at 256.
8. In his first decree, entitled "Fundamental Instructions of the Hijaz, 1926," King
Abdul Aziz stated that he was bound by the rules of shari'a. He would govern Hijaz according
to the Koran and Sunnah. Rules of shari'a would be applied to all criminal, civil, and commer-
cial cases. Id. "A Consultative Council was established by the Organic Instructions, comprised
of a viceroy, his advisors and six notables designated by the king." See Seaman, supra note 1,
at 427.
9. Seaman, supra note 1, at 439-40. In his first decree, above named, King Abdul Aziz
"unif[ied] the legal system under the Hanbali school." Shari'a courts were given jurisdiction
over all disputes regardless of their subject matter or parties involved in them. Id. See also
SAUDI DIGEST, supra note I, at 250-55.
10. Ikhwan means "Muslim brethren." The word refers to radical Muslims as well as to
Wahhabism, a conservative Sunni Islamic Sect. In 1902 when Emir Abdul-Aziz was pro-
claimed as Imam, the religious head in -the Wahhabi movement, he established the "lkhwan
Association" which consisted of extreme Muslims followers during that movement. SAUDI DI-
GEST, supra note 1, at 256. The Ikhwan Association may have inspired the Ikhwan parties in
Egypt in the 1930s, and presently it is found in various Arab countries.
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the government. King Abdul Aziz reacted strongly by suppressing
his rivals. He put an end to the overwhelming traditional power. of
the ikhwan.11 -The King- became the paramount authority in the
realm, 12 and he turned his attention to uniting the country under his
sole leadership.13 Rules were enacted to regulate the affairs of the
state and to act in harmony with the arising needs of the Saudi soci-
ety.14 Also, new rules were enacted to give solutions to those ques-
tions which were addressed in neither the Koran nor the Sunnah.15
However, fundamental directives embodied in these doctrines re-
mained intact. 6 In the near future, it is highly unlikely that the gov-
ernment will enact laws that are contrary to values firmly held by
the general public. Social heritage must be present in the mind of
government when it enacts rules regulating the affairs of the
Kingdom.17
2. Powers of the State.-In Saudi Arabia, the monarch or
king is the sovereign authority. The monarch's position combines leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers.' There is no constitution19
through which state powers and Citizens' rights are determined; the
Council of Ministers' Regulation No. 38 of 1958 functions as the
fundamental enactment of the Kingdom. 0 Besides fundamental
rules such as principles of equality and consultation embodied in
shari'a,' Minister's Regulation No. 38 provides provisions relevant
11. Their leader Faisal AI-Duwaish and some other leaders of the rebellion were put
into prison and severely punished. See SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 256.
12. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, Lectures on Administrative Law 29-33 (1974). See also Sea-
man, supra note 1, at 425-30.
13. "In 1927 Abdul Aziz was crowned king of the realm of Hijaz and Nejd and its
dependencies . . . . In 1932 Abdul Aziz proclaimed himself king of the unified Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia." See Seaman, supra note 1, at 425-26. See also SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at
256-57.
14. Id. at 258-59.
15. Id. at 257. These matters are called al-masalih al-mursala (unrestricted interest).
Khadduri, The Maslaha (Public Interest), and lila (Cause). In Islamic Law, 12 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 213-14 (1979). This term involves interests that are neither prohibited nor
conflicting with the shari'a. For further details, see Seaman, supra note 1, at 443.
16. SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 256, 258.
17. Seaman, supra note 1, at 481. It has been pointed out that:
[T]he future strength and stability of Saudi Arabia will depend to a great
extent upon the degree to which the Kingdom's leaders are able to continue to
devise contemporary adaptations of the shari'a and traditional institutions to re-
tain the Islamic character of the changing society and thus the respect of the
Saudi people.
Id. For similar remarks, see also SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 249, 254, 255.
18. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 29-33.
19. Seaman, supra note 1, at 430. Two attempts have been made to enact a constitution
for Saudi Arabia, but they have failed. The first attempt was in 1960, and the second was in
1962. Failure of these attempts was "believed [to be] that . . . [they] . . . opened up an area
of conflict between conservative and liberal elements which was perceived as having potentially
divisive consequences for the country." Id. at 430.
20. Abd El-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 25.
21. The Consultation Principles is based on the Koran. See KORAN 42:32 (1987).
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to constitutional issues.22 The king's powers, powers of the Council
of Ministers, and the structure of the Executive are defined in the
named Regulation.23
Legislative power is vested in both the king and in the Council
of Ministers (Council)." Regulations are issued by the king by
means of royal decrees and by decisions made by the Council of
Ministers.26 Since there is no elected legislative body to promulgate
necessary legislative enactments,2" the king and the Council of Min-
isters carry out all legislative functions.2 7
Executive power is also vested in the Council of Ministers. 28 Its
head is the king, and the Council's important decisions must be en-
dorsed by the king. 29 The Council of Ministers issues directives nec-
essary for the management of government. 30 In addition, it has,
under the authority of the king, power to supervise government ac-
tivities and to enhance efficiency in the civil service.3'
Under the judicial power, citizens' disputes are heard by the
shari'a courts3 2 whose vital judgments must be approved by the
king. 3 Citizens' claims may also be raised before royal family mem-
bers who have the power to adjudicate these claims or refer them
either to courts or to other administrative authorities.34 However,
disputes involving government activities are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the shari'a court. 35 These disputes are determined by a griev-
22. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 25.
23. Id. at 25-28.
24. Id. at 29. The Council of Ministers was first established in 1931 under the name
"The Consultative Council." In 1953 a ministerial system was institutionalized when King
Abdul Aziz ". . . creat[ed] a Council of Ministers at the national level." See Seaman, supra
note 1, at 427. See also EI-Nafesah, Some Principles Governing The Saudi Civil Service
System, 12 PUB. ADMIN. 5, 7 (1966).
25. Abd El-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 29.
26. Seaman, supra note 1, at 429-30.
27. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 29.
28. Id. at 33-37. For historical developments of the named Council, see Seaman, supra
note 1, at 427-28.
29. Id.
30. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12, at 28.
31. See infra note 77.
32. SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 250-55.
33. Id. at 254.
34. The king supervises the judiciary as the supreme judge in the Kingdom. Cases may
be brought before the king for a determination. This determination may be arrived at after
consultation with the assistants of ulama. Id. at 256. Also, umara (i.e., governors of the differ-
ent regions of the kingdom) may also determine disputes of citizens if there are no courts in
their areas. Id. at 255.
35. Since 1967 shari'a courts have been prevented from reviewing acts of public admin-
istration. Royal Order No. 20941, 1967. King Khalid Abdul Aziz issued this Order as a conse-
quence of a dispute raised by a contractor against the ministry of health. The case was brought
before the sharia grand court in Riyadh, and the director general of the ministry of health
was summoned and ordered to respond to the claimant's claim under oath. As a result, the
king ordered his chief judge to instruct the shari'a court to refrain from adjudicating cases
involving government activities. Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra notes 12 & 13, at 319-20.
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ances board which is directly connected with the king . 6
3. Civil Service and Disciplinary Policies: Characteristics and
Developments.-Immediately upon coming into power, King Abdul
Aziz directed 37 civil servants to remain impartial. He ordered them
to follow the directions of their superiors38 and required them not to
interfere in any activities other than their official duties. Severe pen-
alties were imposed on officials who committed certain offenses that
were contrary to proper conduct and prevailing values.39 Such pun-
ishments were publicized4" so that other officials might be deterred
from committing similar offenses.
These new civil service duties and disciplinary rules were com-
patible with the social values and Islamic heritages.4 1 Though the
Saudi government has enacted civil service and disciplinary regula-
tions influenced by the Egyptian experience, 42 it has also maintained
that the civil service enactments must find their justifications in Is-
lamic law and its heritage. 3
Throughout its history, the Saudi government has enacted vari-
ous civil service regulations and other related enactments44 with
common characteristics. Civil service enactments have traditionally
disqualified persons who committed acts of misconduct from appoint-
ment to the civil service. Civil service rules indicate that acts of
36. See infra text accompanying notes 119-38.
37. Directive issued in Um el Qura, issue no. 1 on 2.12. (1924), cited in EI-Nafesah,
supra note 24, at 6.
38. This legal and formal obligation can be justified by the provisions of the holy Koran.
See KORAN, supra note 21, 4:59. In his article, EI-Nafesah maintained that disciplinary penal-
ties were imposed by the Prophet Mohammed on official offenders. EI-Nafesah, supra note 24,
at 5-6.
Also, the most important enactments are the following: Civil Service Regulation No. 49,
1977; Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971; Grievances Board Reg-
ulation No. M/51, 1985; and The Control and Investigation Agency Instructions issued by the
prime minister under No. 13136/3/R, 1972.
39. Royal Order No. 43, 1957, arts. 1, 2-3, 5, stated that officials who accept bribes,
abuse their authority, or intentionally neglect their duties could be jailed for a maximum of
ten years.
40. EI-Nafesah, supra note 24, at 6.
41. El-Dimyasi, The General Characteristics of the Saudi Civil Service Disciplinary
System, 19 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 249 (1976). Concerning the influence of the shari'a on
the Saudi legal system and the government's approach to its development. See also Brand,
Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1986);
Rahman, Towards Reformulating the Methodology of Islamic Law, 12 NU.U. J. INT'L'L. &
POL. 219 (1979); Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1988);
Yamani, The Eternal Shari'a, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 205 (1979).
42. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
43. See the preamble to the Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7,
10, 1971; EI-Nafesah, Administrative Disciplinary Action, 16 PUB. ADMIN. 5 (1974).
44. See infra note 53.
45. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, arts. 4d, 4f, 4g. This Regulation pre-
vents those who committed acts of misconduct; or those who were jailed as a result of accusa-
tion or improper behavior; or those who were dismissed from the civil service, from appoint-
ment to public offices.
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public employees constitute official offenses even if they were com-
mitted by officials in their daily, private life.46 Misconduct of public
officials was considered an offense for which the actor must be penal-
ized even if it was not directly related to official duties and job re-
quirements. 47 Furthermore, officials were disciplined for acts of neg-
ligence which caused embarrassment to the government or upset the
Muslims. 48 In addition, institutions4 9 dealing with important govern-
ment activities and positions50 were established under names drawn
from Islamic heritage. Such institutions received the public attention
and countenance of clergymen holding religious positions of Call and
Guidance 51 within the Saudi Kingdom. That is to say, civil service
rules have coincided with religious mores adhered to by the Muslims,
who constitute the vast majority of the country's population. 2
Recently, the government has imported foreign civil service ex-
periments, such as the Civil Service Board and the Contral and In-
vestigation Agency, and it has tried to adapt them to the citizens'
needs and social values. Progress has been made, and civil service
and disciplinary rules now in force, appear to be similar to the more
secular rules that have been applicable in neighboring countries.53
Duties and responsibilities of public officials are stated in a broad
way to encompass unforeseen needs and contingencies. Civil service
powers are sufficiently broad to enable them to maintain job effi-
ciency and administrative reform.
Nevertheless, progress remains superficial unless it is accompa-
nied by change based on planned social development. Efforts must be
oriented towards the attitudes and behavior of civil servants. Chang-
46. EI-Dimyasi, supra note 41, at 251-53.
47. Id.
48. After being found negligent in carrying out his duties, a customs officer was penal-
ized. This accused official had allowed rugs, usually used for prayer, to enter Saudi Arabia
with indecent pictures upon them. The Disciplinary Agency Case No. 45, 1974, cited in
Mousa, Disciplinary Offenses in Practice and Theory, 42 PUB. ADMIN., 158 (1982). Mousa
referred to the repealed Civil Service Regulations No. 42, 1971, arts. 82-85. Id. at 145-46.
49. The Grievances Board, set up to determine government disputes, borrows its name
from Islamic history. The present Preamble to the Grievances Board Regulation clearly re-
ferred to that Islamic experience by indicating that the Grievances Board was built upon Is-
lamic heritages and past experience. See Preamble to The Grievances Board Regulation No.
M/51, 1985.
50. Governors of the State are called urnara. The words shaykhs and ulama usually
refer to judges and jurists, respectively. These words and other similar words are used in trea-
tises and articles discussing Islamic Law. See also supra note 15.
51. Officials responsible for Call and Guidance are usually called matawah. Their re-
sponsibility is to enforce Islamic duties and to maintain Islamic values with regard to proper
behavior. See SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 256.
52. EI-Dimyasi, supra note 41, at 25. Tribal traditions also influence government deci-
sions. It has been rightly pointed out that some of the obsolete customs, as well as extreme
opinions of the Ikhwan, have been obstacles for change and hinderances toward rapid develop-
ment. SAUDI DIGEST, supra note 1, at 259.
53. Compare enactments cited in supra note 38 with similar Egyptian enactments (i.e.,
The Civil Service Employees Act No. 47, 1978; The Administrative Deputy and Disciplinary
Proceedings Act, No. 117, 1958; and The Council of the State Act No. 47, 1972).
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ing common attitudes toward work and the promotion of creativity
within the civil service, is a major concern in developing countries.
Pre-service training programs and on-the-job training may serve as
means for achieving this vital purpose. Furthermore, managers must
be made fully aware of these prerequisites. Managers must be care-
fully chosen and qualified in their managerial duties. They must take
the lead in affecting social change by motivating their subordinates
through new methods of management which are capable of creating
a healthy environment within the civil service. Through these means,
officials may be influenced to accept the changes and new ideas that
are crucial during this transformation period.
B. Kuwait
1. Constitutional Introduction.-The State of Kuwait was es-
tablished and has developed in a different manner from the Saudi
State. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait is a "Sunni" Muslim state5 4
with its population being Muslim. However, Kuwait has not been
influenced by the extreme version of Islam followed by the Wahabbi
movement. There has been no obligation on the state's part to adhere
firmly to all the rules embodied in the Koran and Sunnah, as is the
situation in Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, unlike the Saudi State, Kuwait does have a con-
stituent constitution. Kuwait's Constitution5 dictates that Islam's
law is a basic source for legislation. 6 Accordingly, there is no prohi-
bition on the state to enact legislation through elected representa-
tives of the people. This Constitution 'defines the powers of the
state57 and guarantees fundamental citizens' rights.5 8 It provides for
an elected national assembly responsible for the legislative function
of the state.5 9 Civil service matters are regulated by acts enacted by
the legislature.6" Government activities are carried out under both
the authority of the legislature61 and the supervision of the
judiciary. 62
54. Seaman, supra note 1, at 414 & 417; Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform,
36 AM. J. COMp. L. 729, 751-52 (1988). See also The Wash. Post, April 21, 1991, at A21.
55. KUWAITI CONST. (1962).
56. Id. art. 2. This Article has stated that Islamic Law is a basic source for legislation,
but it does not state that it is the sole source for legislation. The Preamble of the Kuwaiti
Constitution has explained this provision by saying that it allows the state to enact legislation
that is suitable for arising needs and developments. Notwithstanding that that shari'a contains
provisions for criminal cases, the Preamble goes on to say that this Article of the Constitution
enables the legislature to issue criminal laws containing modern provisions to satisfy new cir-
cumstances. See, 5 KUWAITI LEGISLATION'S COLLECTION 63 (1981).
57. KUWAITI CONST., art. 5.
58. Id. arts. 27-49.
59. Id. arts. 79, 80.
60. Id. art. 26.
61. Id. arts. 98-101.
62. Id. art. 169.
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2. Civil Service and Disciplinary Policies: Characteristics and
Developments.-Kuwa it's civil service rules and its disciplinary sys-
tem63 are based primarily on its social heritage 64 and political envi-
ronment.65 Although disciplinary and civil service rules have been
influenced by other experiences,66 these two items are the most influ-
ential. Improper acts of civil servants (i.e., drinking alcohol, lying,
and not praying at the appropriate times) are considered official of-
fenses, 7 even if they have been committed outside the- workplace and
even if they have no relevance to job performance. Prevailing val-
ues68 are to be taken into consideration when an official discharges
his formal duties.
The civil service act presently in force 9 has been a set-back to
the civil service system which was established by an act of Parlia-
ment.7" Guarantees that once provided for civil servants in the legal
system, have been curtailed. 71 Consequently, job security and job
performance may be adversely affected.72 That is to say, civil service
affairs should be regulated by the legislature, without the influence
of the executive. The legislature must not equip the former authority
63. Today, disciplinary actions are governed by the provisions of The Civil Service Act
No. 15, 1979, arts. 27-32, issued on April 4, 1979. Detailed provisions concerning disciplinary
actions are embodied in The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, arts. 54-81, made in
pursuance of Article I of the above stated Act.
64. The Civil Service Act No. 15, 1979, arts. 21, 24, 25.
65. Id. arts. 1-5.
66. The Civil Service Law and the Kuwaiti legal system clearly have been influenced by
the legal systems of both Egypt and the United Kingdom. The influence of these competing
legal systems is found within the express provisions of Articles 169 and 171 of the Kuwaiti
Constitution. Following the British pattern of judicial review of administrative action (i.e., the
Unitary judicial system of common law countries) Article 169 of the Kuwaiti Constitution
states "that government activities could be reviewed before a special court (of the judiciary) or
before a panel of a court of justice as it may be determined by an Act of the legislature." On
the other hand, following the Egyptian and the French model of judicial review of administra-
tive action, Article 171 states that "a council of the State (i.e., administrative courts indepen-
dent of ordinary courts and directly connected with the head of the executive) may be estab-
lished by an Act of Parliament." See also, the Constitutional Court Act No. 14, 1973. This
Act has been drawn in light of an Egyptian Act entitled The High Court, No. 81 of 1969,
according to which constitutional claims against acts of parliament could be reviewed before
this Constitutional Court (i.e., The High Court).
See also the Kuwaiti Civil Service Act No. 7, 1960. This Act was influenced by similar
civil service laws in Egypt. However, the Kuwaiti state has not yet adopted a bilateral judicial
system in which government disputes must be reviewed before a separate set of administrative
courts. Government disputes are solved by ordinary courts of justice. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 189-92.
67. The Civil Service Act, No. 15, 1979, arts. 21, 24, 25.
68. See KUWAITI CONST. 69 (1962).
69. The Civil Service Act, No. 15, 1979.
70. The repealed Civil Service Act is Act No. 7, 1960. See infra note 71, at 161.
71. See M. AFIFI AND B. SALIH, THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND
GUARANTEES - A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS OF EGYPT, KUWAIT AND
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 352-54 & 481-82 (1982) [hereinafter AFIFI].
72. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. It would seem that the Kuwaiti state has
tried to abridge the constitution and the rights guaranteed by it. Parliament was dissolved in
1986, and the government exercised excessive power against its opponents. See, The Wash.
Post, supra note 54, at A21.
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with a plenary power at the expense of the civil servants and the
public interest.
III. Disciplinary and Managerial Authorities: Structure and Power
A. Saudi Arabia
1. Managerial and Supervisory Authorities
a. The Civil Service Board.-In Saudi Arabia, civil service
policies are determined by the Civil Service Board (CSB) according
to the provisions of the civil service regulation. 73 In 1980 a Civil Ser-
vice Board Regulation which defined the duties and responsibilities
of the CSB was enacted. 4 Its chairman is a deputy prime minister,7 5
while its members are the following: the head of the civil service
commission, three ministers appointed by a royal order based on a
recommendation of the chairman of the CSB, and three other mem--
bers - experts in civil service matters - appointed by the King.76
The CSB recommends civil service regulation proposals to be
enacted by the appropriate authority.7 7 It enacts secondary regula-
tions to put into effect the provisions of the enabling regulations. 8
The CSB supervises implementation of civil service regulations and
relevant civil service rules. 9 It has authority to implement rules that
are necessary for maintaining a merit system80 and an efficiently
functioning government."' Job classification 2 and establishment of
on-the-job training" are also within the main duties of the Civil Ser-
vice Board.
This CSB bears the primary responsibility for maintaining ad-
ministrative development in Saudi Arabia. Important authorities and
specialized committees have close ties 4 with the CSB, which enables
it to closely supervise the implementation of civil service policies.
The authority invested to it enables it to carry out its immense duties
with remarkable success; however, it is advisable for the CSB not to
be involved in minute details8 5 of the civil service. General policy
73. The Civil Service Act No. 15, 1979, art. 39.
74. This Regulation was issued by Royal Decree No. M/48, 1980. It was enacted in
pursuance of the provision of Article 39 of The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977.
75. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 5.
76. Id. art. 5.
77. Id. art. 9/A.
78. Id. art. 9/B.
79. Id. art. 10/A.
80. Id. art. 10/E.
81. Id. art. 9/C, 2, 4.
82. Id. art. 10/B, f.
83. Id. art. 9/C-2.
84. See id. arts. 3; 9/C-3; 9/C-4. The Civil Service Commission, The Institute of Public
Administration, and The Control and Investigation Agency are only some of the agencies
which have close relations with the Civil Service Board. Id.
85. One of the characteristics of the Saudi Civil Service System is the formality and
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guidelines accompanied by a broad supervisory role helps the Civil
Service Board to maintain an efficient civil service system.
b. The Control and Investigation Agency.-Established 86 in
1974, the Control and Investigation Agency (Agency) was created as
a counterpart to the disciplinary agency established under the same
enabling enactment.87 Both of these agencies were responsible for
control and investigation,88 as well as for disciplinary matters89
within the civil service. However, matters previously determined by
the disciplinary agency have since been transferred9" to the Griev-
ances Board (Board)," and the disciplinary agency has been abol-
ished.92 Meanwhile, investigation and control functions have re-
mained under the responsibility of the Control and Investigation
Agency.93
As its name implies, this agency discharges two important func-
tions.94 First, it exercises overall supervision of the administrative
and financial activities95 of civil servants. The Agency exercises its
controlling power through officials of its control division. Findings of
this division are reported to the Agency head. 96 Second, when fur-
ther inquiry is needed, the Agency head may order an investigation
to be completed by an official in the agency's investigative division. 97
Certain procedural safeguards exist to protect civil servants
from unfair treatment. The Agency's head must contact the minister
of the accused official's department in order to coordinate any inves-
tigation.98 Investigations also must be carried out in the presence of
the accused's immediate supervisor. 99 Inquiries outside the work-
place must be carried out by the security authorities, not by the
Agency.1"' For instance, inspection of the accused's place of resi-
dence is carried out by the respective authority in the presence of a
detailed rules. See RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS; QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ANNEXED TO THE
CIVIL SERVICE REGULATION (1st Collection, 2nd ed. 1986) [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS].
86. It was established in pursuance of the provisions of the Civil Servants' Disciplinary
System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 1.
87. Id. art. 14.
88. Id. arts. 2-13.
89. Id. arts. 15-30.
90. Royal Decree No. M/51, 1985, art. 4. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/
51, 1985, was issued by this decree.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 127-35.
92. Royal Decree No. M/51, 1985, art. 5.
93. Id. arts. 2, 3.
94. This agency is subdivided into two fundamental divisions: control and investigation.
See The Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 3.
95. Id. art. 5.
96. Id. art. 6.
97. Id. art. 7.
98. Id. art. 8.
99. Id.
100. Id. art. 9.
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representative of the named agency.10 1 Also, serious accusations
which may require dismissal of the accused are referred by the
Agency to the Grievances Board for determination of a suitable
penalty. 102
To conclude, the Agency has had a crucial role in the sphere of
the civil service. It supervises and .investigates official activities. It
may also report its findings to the Grievances Board or to the ac-
cused official's minister for further action. This is to say, the Agency
can investigate and prosecute, but it can not impose penalties on civil
servant offenders. Disciplinary penalties are imposed only by the re-
spective disciplinary authorities.
2. Disciplinary Authorities
a. The Minister's Disciplinary Power.-The Saudi Civil Ser-
vice system confers certain disciplinary powers' 03 on ministers and
heads of independent public authorities, 0 4 which enable them to
maintain their agencies' policies. 0 15 Disobedience"'° is a grave offense
that may result in severe penalties such as the following: caution,
reprimand, reduction in salary, an "annual salary increase" delay, or
dismissal. 0 7 For example, officials are barred from criticizing their
superior's civil service policies. Specifically, no government policy
may be scrutinized by civil servants. 08 Civil servants are also re-
quired to behave properly 0 9 and to refrain from abusing their
powers. 10
The civil service regulation empowered the minister to impose
any of the above stated"' penalties except dismissal." 12 There is no
stated provision in any of the relevant regulations that directly con-
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 17.
103. Id. art. 35. See also The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 32.
104. The following disciplinary penalties may be imposed on civil servants holding grade
10 and below: caution, reprimand, reduction in salary, an "annual salary increase" delay, or
dismissal. High ranking officials of grade II and above may be disciplined by one of the fol-
lowing penalties: caution, an "annual salary increase" delay, or dismissal. See Civil Servants'
Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 32. Senior officials include the deputy
minister, the assistant deputy minister, and directors holding grade 11 and above. See IN-
STRUCTIONS, supra note 85, arts. 6, 6-1.
105. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 35. See also,
The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 32.
106. Id. art. 11, c.
107. See supra note 104.
108. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, arts. 11, c; 12, e. See also INSTRUC-
TION, supra note 85, arts. 11, 1; The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 39.
109. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 11, a. This article expressly states
that officials must behave properly whether inside or outside the work environment.
110. Id. art. 12, a. Accepting bribes and gifts are also considered acts of misconduct. Id.
arts. 12, c; 12, d.
11. Supra note 104.
112. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 35.
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fers on superiors, other than the minister, the power to impose penal-
ties on subordinate officials. However, the civil service regulations do
empower the minister to delegate authority.11 Based on this authori-
zation, deputy ministers have been empowered to discharge any min-
isterial function except functions not delegated by the minister.1"
The minister may also delegate in writing' 5 certain functions to
other senior officials.' 6 Accordingly, disciplinary powers may be for-
mally delegated by the minister if desired. To conclude, the Saudi
civil service system confers on the minister very wide disciplinary
powers. It is hoped that these powers will not be abused.
b. The Grievances Board's Disciplinary Powers.-The Griev-
ances Board (Board) was established in 1954117 and was authorized
to make recommendations concerning matters within its jurisdic-
tion. 1 8 However, these recommendations could not be implemented
unless they were approved by the appropriate minister.'19 Since 1985
the Board has been empowered to make final decisions concerning
subjects within its jurisdiction.12 Disciplinary cases121 are among the
government disputes 22 that are adjudicated by the Grievances
Board.' 23
Assistant councilors, councilors, an assistant deputy head, and a
deputy head discharge the duties of the Board under the authority of
the Board's head.124 Meanwhile, the Board's head is directly respon-
sible to the king"' and must report to the king concerning all mat-
ters it has handled." 6
113. Id. art. 31.
114. See INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85, arts. 1, 31.
115. Id. arts. 2, 3, 31.
116. Id.
117. Royal Decree No. 2/3/59/87, 1954, cited in Abd EI-Fatah Hassan, supra note 12,
at 322. Prior to this Decree, the Board was a section within the organizational structure of the
administrative units of the Council of Ministers. Id. at 321.
118. Id. at 323-24, 326-30.
119. Id. at 324-26.
120. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 8:
121. Id. art. 8, e. Disciplinary actions previously were determined by the disciplinary
agency. When this agency was abolished, its duties were transferred to the Grievances Board.
See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
122. The Board has jurisdiction to determine the following: disputes concerning civil
servants salaries and other financial claims related to their service; claims to quash invalid
decisions of public administration; compensation claims against public agencies; government
contract disputes; criminal cases concerning bribes and similar offenses; claims to implement
foreign decisions; and other duties assigned to the Board by other enactments. See The Griev-
ances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 9.
123. Claims against acts of public administration must be based on one of the following
grounds: lack of jurisdiction, procedural defects, violations of regulations, misapplication of
legal rules, or abuse of power. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, arts. 1-b, 8.
124. Id. art. 12.
125. Id. art. 1. This Article reads: "The Grievances Board is an independent administra-
tive judicial agency directly connected with the King." Id.
126. Id. art. 47.
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Furthermore, the Grievances Board determines disciplinary
cases referred to it by the Control and Investigation Agency. 127 It
can impose on the accused any penalty, 121 including dismissal. 129
These disciplinary decisions are final, with the exception of dismis-
sals involving officials of the eleventh grade and above."' Such deci-
sions must be approved by the king.131 The Board is also the sole
authority empowered13 2 to determine disciplinary actions involving
officials who have left the civil service; 13 3 under that circumstance, it
can impose a monetary penalty on the accused, 34 or it can bar the
offender from a civil service appointment for a certain period of
time.3 5
Shari'a courts have no jurisdiction to review the Board's deci-
sions,13 nor are its decisions reviewed before any authority other
than the king. The Grievances Board is directly answerable to the
king who may direct the Board to handle its activities in a specified
manner. However, its decisions are judicial in character. They have
far reaching legal implications on parties involved in government ac-
tivities. Therefore, the Grievances Board should have an appellate
court oversee its functions, or in the alternative, the Grievances
Board should function as an appellate court overseeing another court
of first instance. Citizens' rights and the interests of parties involved
in government disputes could be better protected as a result.
B. Kuwait
1. The Civil Service Board: Structure and Managerial Du-
ties.-The Kuwaiti Constitution mandates that civil service policies
must be laid down by the legislature. 3 7 The Civil Service Act
(Act) 1 8 provides general rules to be followed by the executive. 3 9
127. Id. art. 8, e.
128. Supra note 104.
129. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 36.
130. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 8, c. See also Article 4 of
the Royal Decree No. M/51, 1985, according to which disciplinary powers of the disciplinary
agency were transferred to the Board.
Civil service positions are classified into ten groups. See The Civil Service Board Decision
No. 440, 1984, annexed to INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85, at 28. Grades of civil servants range
from grade I to grade 15, which is the highest grade in the civil service grades ladder. See the
Royal Decree No. M/29, 1984, annexed to INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85, at 82.
131. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 8, e. See also the Royal
Decree No. M/51, 1985, art. 4.
132. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 33.
133. The official service is terminated by force of law; if the official was penalized by a
shari'a court for a criminal offense or if he commits an improper act, such as rape, taking
bribes, theft, or using drugs. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85, arts. 80; 16, a; 16 b; 16 c.
134. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 33.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 36, 119-37 and accompanying text.
137. KUWAITI CONST. art. 26 (1962).
138. See supra note 63.
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This Act mandates the establishment of a Civil Service Board.'
The prime minister is the head of this Board,'"" and the Civil Service
Council" 2 discharges its function under its close supervision.
Chief among the important functions of the Board are 4 s the
following: maintaining administrative reform; developing the organi-
zational structure of the executive; proposing civil service bills and
regulation proposals; issuing mandatory interpretations for civil ser-
vice laws; supervising, evaluating, and enhancing civil service per-
formance; classifying jobs;' and determining training policies and
programs. Permanent and ad hoc committees assist the Civil Service
Board in handling its managerial duties.'45 Civil service policies are
supervised by the executive which must carry out its duties under the
authority of Parliament.
2. Disciplinary Authorities
a. Superiors' Disciplinary Powers.-Unlike the Saudi Civil
Service enactments, Kuwait's legislation explicitly confers discipli-
nary powers on the deputy minister.14 6 Deputy ministers may impose
any penalty "7 on officials of the technical and service categories.' 8
On officials of the general category, they may impose all penalties
except dismissal.' 9 However, a minister can either amend his dep-
uty's disciplinary decisions or revoke these decisions.15*
Occupants of offices in the general category may be dismissed
by the minister.15 ' The minister may also impose a written "caution"
139. Id. art. 1. Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, was enacted in pursuance of this
Article.
140. The Civil Service Act No. 15, 1979, art. 4.
.141. Id. The above stated article mandates that both the Board's members and its proce-
dures are to be determined by a royal decree. Members of the Board are: the prime minister
(acting as the chairman), minister of planning, minister of education, minister of justice, and
the minister for administrative and legal affairs.
142. The Civil Service Council is the permanent executive arm of the Board. It imple-
ments civil service policies under the authority of the Board. See The Civil Service Act No. 15,
1979.
143. Id. arts. 5, 9-10, 19.
144. Civil service jobs are either permanent or temporary. Permanent jobs are classified
into four categories: the highest category, the general category, the technical category, and the
service category. See The Civil Service Act No. 15, 1979, art. 12. Grades in the civil service
range from grade 3 up to the excellent grade. The highest category includes the excellent
grade, the deputy minister, and the assistant of the deputy minister. These grades are embod-
ied in the schedule annexed to The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977.
145. The Civil Service Act No. 15, 1979, art. 4.
146. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 61.
147. Id. art. 60. Penalties which could be imposed on civil servants other than the high-
est category are the following: reprimand; reduction in salary for not more than ninety days a
year: reduction in salary for not more than one year, or demotion in grade and dismissal. Id.
148. Id. art. 61.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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penalty on senior officials.' Meanwhile, other penalties may be im-
posed on the latter by the Civil Service Board.
153
b. The Civil Service Board's Disciplinary Powers.-Besides its
very wide managerial duties,'15 the Civil Service Board also sits as a
disciplinary authority.1 55 The full membership of this Board, or a
committee of its members,' 56 is the sole authority which can impose
certain penalties on senior officials. 57 It has been rightly pointed out
that disciplinary matters must be distinguished from quasi-political
matters. 158 Disciplinary disputes should be handled by specialized
authorities, but not by politicians.
This new'59 disciplinary policy is a major setback for the
Kuwaiti disciplinary system. Due process of law should be strictly
adhered to, and further protection is needed to maintain stability in
the civil service. Job security is one of the prerequisites for a fair and
efficient civil service system, but this can not be achieved by cur-
tailing civil servant guarantees. Furthermore it is not a rational civil
service policy to maintain job efficiency at the expense of job secur-
ity. Both objectives should be maintained by a rational disciplinary
system.
Nevertheless, government policymakers and politicians must not
be deprived of their discretionary powers. They must be equipped
with the powers necessary to maintain the state's security and the
public interest. They should be authorized to dismiss high ranking
officials for political considerations,8 0 but disciplinary matters must
be handled by specialized authorities. The latter authorities must
discharge their function by due process of law and under the supervi-
sion of courts of justice.
152. Penalties which could be imposed on the highest category officials are "... lim-
ited; the only penalties are: a written..." caution, a reprimand, and dismissal. See The Civil
Service Act No. 15, 1979, art. 28. See also The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 60.
153. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 60.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 137-45.
155. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 62.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. AFIFI, supra note 71, 352-54.
159. Previous laws provided better guarantees to the civil servant. The Civil Service Law
of 1955 established two disciplinary councils which consisted of high ranking officials who
determined disciplinary actions involving civil servants. Meanwhile, the Civil Service Act No.
18, 1960, established three councils to deal with disciplinary disputes involving officials of the
different civil service categories. Furthermore, disciplinary procedures were better elaborated.
See AFIFI, supra note 71, 346-51.
160. It is worth noting that the Civil Service Act, supra note 63, has conferred on the
Executive a plenary power to achieve this end. Article 32 of this Act states: "The official
service could be terminated for . . . [d]ismissal by the Council of Ministers for maintaining
the public interest .... " No one should argue against dismissals based on political considera-
tions. Policy decision makers should be equipped with the necessary powers so that they can
maintain the state's vital interests. Disciplinary penalties must be imposed, however, according
to fair procedure and guarantees must be provided to maintain a fair trial.
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C. Analysis
In both legal systems, acts of misconduct constitute official of-
fenses. Civil servants are obliged to act properly, and they must not
harm the reputation of the civil service. As such, they may be pun-
ished for acts of misconduct committed outside the sphere of the
civil service. They must not violate Islamic traditions or prevailing
social values.
The Saudi civil service system appears to be greatly influenced
by Islamic traditions and social values. The civil servant must
strictly observe Islamic values and the social customs followed by the
society. Government regulations and rules tend to emphasize this as-
pect of the civil service. Specific provisions are enacted for maintain-
ing Islamic traditions and mores. Furthermore, an explicit provision
in the Saudi system requires the civil servant to act in harmony with
the government's policy. This provision, it would seem, puts more
restrictions on a Saudi's civil servant's activities than on activities of
a Kuwaiti civil servant.
The Saudi and Kuwaiti disciplinary system confer plenary disci-
plinary powers without serious limitations. Ministers and heads of
independent public agencies are vested with excessive powers which
must not be abused by them. However, the Kuwaiti disciplinary sys-
tem decentralizes powers much more than the Saudi system. The
former system empowers more than one superior to impose penalties.
Saudi senior officials, on the other hand, can impose penalties, but
only under a delegated authority by the minister. It would seem that
differences in the political environments in these countries are among
the factors which dictate such different courses of action.
Furthermore, serious penalties involving Kuwaiti's senior offi-
cials are to be imposed by a committee of the Council of Ministers
(i.e., The Civil Service Board). This is an administrative, political
review process. By contrast, similar penalties are to be imposed on
Saudi senior officials by a judicial administrative tribunal (i.e., The
Grievances Board). It should be remembered that the Grievances
Board is directly responsible to the executive. That is to say, the ex-
ecutive in both countries is the paramount authority. Moreover, sep-
aration of powers does not exist in the Saudi Arabian legal
system. 161
Civil service trends and developments in both countries show
that policies have been introduced to accelerate administrative re-
form and to adapt modern civil service rules to the requirements in
these countries. Nevertheless, civil service policies may be hindered
without providing a secure environment for civil servants. Since they
161. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
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can be easily dismissed, they may be reluctant to make difficult deci-
sions, and creativity may be hindered as a consquence. The success
of these modern policies depends to a large extent on their accept-
ance by the civil servant as well as the society at large. Social and
political circumstances must be present in the minds of civil service
reformers. Social development plans must be coordinated with ad-
ministrative reform plans to lay down a solid foundation for steady
and continuing progress in the civil service.
IV. Procedures, Avenues of Appeals, and Safeguards
A. Saudi Arabia
In Saudi Arabia, penalties imposed by the minister, or by an
official acting under the minister's delegated authority, are not im-
posed without formal investigation.16 2 The accused is given an oppor-
tunity to defend the case before a final decision is made. 63 Decisions
must state the claims of the accused and the defense as well.1
64
Disciplinary decisions made by senior officials may be reviewed
before the minister.' 65 However, there is no formal appellate judicial
avenue for claims against the disciplinary decisions made by the
minister; such disciplinary decisions are conveyed to the Control and
Investigation Agency and to the Civil Service Commission. 66 The
named Agency may conduct a further investigation if it finds that
the charges against the disciplined justify dismissal. 6 7 Investigation
must be carried out in the presence of the accused, unless there are
justifications to the contrary.'6 8 The case is then referred to the
Grievances Board to determine a suitable penalty. 6 9
The Grievances Board entertains disciplinary claims in a judi-
cial capacity. 7 ° The accused is to be informed, in advance, about the
accusation invoked against him.' 7 ' A trial must be carried out in the
presence of the accused who is entitled to be represented by a solici-
tor. 172 The accused is also entitled to present his case before the
162. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 35.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. There is no express legislative provision to this effect. Nevertheless, this view could
be inferred from INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 85. Article 31-6 of these instructions implicitly
supports this opinion. It reads "Delegation will not absolve the delegator of his responsibility."
Id. As long as the minister remains responsible for actions of his delegate, it is reasonable to
believe that the delegator must have authority to review delegated acts of his subordinate.
166. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 39.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 10.
169. Id. art. 34.
170. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 1.
171. Civil Servants' Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 19.
172. Id. art. 20.
Spring 1992]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Board and to summon witnesses as a defense. 1 3 The Board's deci-
sions are determined by panels duly established for this purpose. 17"
These decisions are final except dismissal decisions involving senior
officials, 7 5 which must be approved by the king so that they can be
enforced. 76
To conclude, the Saudi disciplinary system procedures seem to
be simple. Decisions can be made quickly, and protection is afforded
to the civil servant. However, there is inadequate due process. In the
future, further avenues of appeal must be made available. The offi-
cial's entitlement to office is a fundamental right which should not
be infringed upon without due process of law. With a right of appeal
to an independent reviewing body, the official's rights will be main-
tained, and the public interest will be secured as well.
B. Kuwait
Disciplinary decisions made by the minister or a senior official
must be based on investigation, 177 which may be formal or infor-
mal.178 The accused is referred to investigation by the minister or the
deputy as the case may require. 7 9 The investigation is to be carried
out in the presence of the accused who is entitled to be informed
about the accusations raised against him.180 Decisions must state
reasons justifying the imposed penalty."8" Disciplinary penalties im-
posed by the deputy minister can be reviewed before the minister. 82
The latter may then amend the penalty or even revoke it.'8 3
Disciplinary cases that are not within the jurisdiction of the
subordinate's superiors are to be determined by the Civil Service
Board. 18 4 The CSB can appoint a committee of its members to re-
view the case. 85 Further investigation may be carried out by its
member or by another official appointed by the CSB.' 8  Consultation
may be made with persons other than the appointed members. 8 7 De-
cisions made by the committee must then receive CSB approval. The
173. Id.
174. The Grievances Board Regulation No. M/51, 1985, art. 6.
175. Id. at art. 8, e. See also, the Royal Decree No. M/51, 1985, art. 4; Civil Servants'
Disciplinary System Regulation No. M/7, 1971, art. 28.
176. Id.
177. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 55.
178. Id.
179. Id. art. 56.
180. Id. art. 57.
181. Id. art. 55.
182. Id. art. 6.
183. Id.
184. Supra notes 155-60.
185. The Civil Service Regulation No. 49, 1977, art. 62.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Civil Service Board's decision is final;'88 it-cannot be reviewed before
any other administrative authority.
However, disciplinary decisions may be reviewed before Courts
of Justice. 89 Claims against disciplinary decisions may be raised
before the Court of First Instance. 9 ' These claims must be based on
certain general grounds of review. 9' The namedcourt's decisions are
reviewable on appeal before a court whose determination is final.'
92
The Kuwaiti disciplinary system provides the judicial legal pro-
cedures and appellate avenues which are necessary for securing a
fair disciplinary system. Nevertheless, in the future, a further ad-
ministrative appellate avenue should be available to review decisions
made by the civil servant's superior. Moreover, disciplinary cases
should be determined by disciplinary councils, not by the Civil Ser-
vice.Board. The Board's members are heavily involved in the policy-
making process. Their broad responsibilities allow no time to deter-
mine disciplinary cases with due care. Disciplinary cases should be
left to specialized authorities acting under the supervision of Courts
of Justice.
V. Evaluation and Recommendations
The disciplinary legal systems of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
undergone rapid developments and fundamental changes. Institu-
tions have been established to manage and to regulate civil service
activities. Civil service reform policies have been introduced to accel-
erate administrative reform, as well as to enhance efficiency in the
civil service.
Trends in the laws of both countries show that the responsible
Saudi and Kuwaiti authorities are inclined to import new adminis-
trative devices and to adapt them to the civil service requirements
and social traditions that prevail in each country. Trends and devel-
opments also indicate that administrative reform in both countries is
influenced by their respective political, traditional, and social cir-
cumstances. Social development programs, therefore, must accom-
pany administrative reform plans to lay down a solid foundation for
effective and continuous developments in these countries.
188. Id.
189. The Court of First Instance Chamber For Reviewing Government Disputes Act
No. 20, arts. 1, 4, 7, 1981. This Chamber of the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to
review officials claims concerning salaries, allowance, and retirement pensions, as well as
claims to quash invalid acts of public administration concerning decisions of appointment and
promotion and claims against disciplinary decisions.
190. Id. art. 1. Dismissals by the Council of Ministers are, however, excluded from judi-
cial review. Id. art. 1, 4.
191. Id. art. 4. Grounds of judicial review include: lack of jurisdiction, procedural de-
fects, violating the law or applying and interpreting it incorrectly, and abuse of power. Id.
192. Id. art. 13.
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Human resources in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as in any coun-
try, are the major means for creating change and developments. At-
titudes toward work must be influenced to be positive. Leaders and
managers in the civil service must create a healthy environment
which motivates the civil servant, while maintaining stability and
creativity within the civil service. Channels of communication be-
tween the head and the civil servant must be opened. Well-designed
training programs will influence change and enhance efficiency. Pol-
icy guidelines must be made known to the civil servant to insure
awareness of duties and responsibilities. Most importantly, these pol-
icy guidelines should be conveyed by newspapers, memoranda, and
office instructions.
Job security is one of the major objectives in a rational civil
service system. Accordingly, further appellate avenues must be
opened for the civil servant. New administrative channels of appeal
are needed in both countries. In addition, basic judicial appellate av-
enue must be introduced into the Saudi civil service system.
Disciplinary powers, in both legal systems, must be conferred on
administrative authorities, but not on political leaders. Disciplinary
matters are specialized subjects and must be handled by particular,
neutral authorities. The disciplinary legal structure in both systems
should be modified to meet this requirement. Proposed administra-
tive appellate avenues must be organized in such a way as to enable
these authorities to discharge their duties without interference by
heads of public agencies involved in the dispute. That is to say, these
proposed disciplinary authorities should have genuine independence
and their neutrality must be ensured.
Judicial review of administrative action is a crucial element in a
fair disciplinary system. Kuwait seems to follow a good pattern for
judicial review. It is hoped that this system will be strengthened by
expanding the scope of judicial review and by maintaining the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. It is also hoped that external legal exper-
iences will not influence the Kuwaiti government to replace its uni-
tary judicial system with a bilateral judicial one. Such drastic
change will complicate the Kuwaiti legal system and will increase
the government's litigation costs.
Judicial review of administrative action in Saudi Arabia is the
duty of the Grievances Board. Shari'a courts have been prevented
from reviewing acts of public administration to maintain the flexible
function of government. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the Board
must be reinforced further. Moreover, another judicial appellate ave-
nue should be introduced within the structure of the Grievances
Board to provide further guarantees to the civil servant. Modifica-
tions within the structure of the 'Board should be made to give effect
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to this recommendation.
To conclude, the Saudi and Kuwaiti civil service systems have
introduced new policies and have established new institutions to im-
plement them. Job security and job efficiency are the main goals of a
rational civil service system. Both countries should endeavor to main-
tain these objectives through additional appellate avenues, and thus,
maintain the public interest and citizens' rights.

